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THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE SOUTH SUDAN QUESTION: RECONSIDERING MODERATION
The South Sudanese struggle for independence was one of the more debated postcolonial liberation wars. Not only did it challenge the sanctity of post-colonial borders, but it also had the potential to destabilize regional geopolitics, as South Sudan lies on major water sources and oil reserves. Consequently, while the South Sudanese separatists gained support from some African governments, many other regional actors opposed their demand for independence.
One of the fiercest opponents of South Sudanese independence was the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood (MB). as well as the London-based student journal Sawt al-Ghoraba (the Foreigners' Voice); and, for later periods, the MB's official website, Ikhwan Online. Analysing the MB's agenda requires some great caution, since the movement is far from being a monolith. 2 The MB developed throughout the years a pluralist structure and flexible hierarchy. This has enabled its survival amid government repression, but also resulted in inter-generational and ideological contestations within the movement. 3 Primary sources do not always reflect these inner tensions.
Secondary sources, although providing essential background information, may use primary sources selectively and deliver a biased image of the movement and its ideology. The hypothesis about the MB's moderation has come under considerable criticism in recent studies. These works have illustrated that the MB failed to meet its own standards of moderation. According to Katerina Dalacoura, although the movement committed itself to the electoral process, it 'has made the least progress towards moderate positions on social issues' in comparison to other, even Islamist, movements. 21 In contrast to their declarations, the MB's leadership, including the middle-aged leaders, did not take tangible measures toward equal representation for women and non-Muslims. In contradiction of its advocacy of free speech, Dalacoura shows, the MB acted to censor scholarly or literary works deemed offensive to
Islam, sometimes in collaboration with the government. 22 Even the MB's commitment to the electoral process remained partial. In contrast to the reformists' public endorsement of the electoral process, conservative circles within the movement kept viewing democracy as merely a way of replacing the Egyptian government. Some of these conservatives refused to use the term 'democracy', believing that sovereignty lies only within God and not the people. 23 Neither of these works has denied that the MB has transformed throughout the decades.
But they have questioned whether this could be described as moderation. As Dalacoura puts it, 'If moderation is always a relative concept, the Brotherhood is clearly "moderate" in an Egypt which has become increasingly conservative and religious-minded over the last few decades'.
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However, this process has far from a linear progress toward liberalism, but rather 'a path marked by profound inconsistencies and contradictions, yielding agendas in which newly embraced themes of freedom and democracy coexist uneasily with illiberal religious concepts carried over from the past'. 25 This could be partly blamed on the movement's own fragmented nature. 26 Yet, ambivalence toward democracy has also appeared among middle-aged reformers. 27 The rest of this article seeks to support this critique of the moderation hypothesis. It does so by focusing on the MB's foreign policy stands rather than domestic agenda. The MB's Cairo-based al-Da'wa magazine described Sudan as 'an exemplary beacon to be followed'. The idea of Sudan as a gate to Africa echoed in the Islamist discourse about the country.
The MB has seen Islamization as a civilizing mission. It too viewed Sudan as a gate to spreading Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. 35 Mohammed Mahmud Ghali, a scholar at al-Azhar
University and a veteran MB activist, wrote that 'Africa south of the Sahara remained untouched by global civilization for centuries. The blame is on Arab Africa, which was keener on transferring its civilization to Europe and ignored Africa south of the Sahara'. The world, he continued, 'would have been a different place had Arab Africa not forgotten about the continent surrounding it and its brothers to the south'. 36 The solution according to Ghali was to spread Islam in the continent. 37 This notion paved the way to an intense MB's campaign against the South Sudanese rebels.
The MB and the South Sudan Question
The Garang' and asserted that 'it is well known that John Garang's movement is a Christian one, aiming to separate the South from the rest of Sudan and turn it into a Christian enclave'. 44 Southern insurgency was described as 'the strikes of the Christian minority in the South'. 45 
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The 1989 coup and the ascent of the NCP government in Khartoum intensified these attacks. As the South Sudanese rebels presented their demands to the new government, Liwa' al-Islam, another MB monthly printed in Cairo, recounted that 'the South Sudanese fanatic John Garang exposed his ambitions. Unsurprisingly, he still receives international aid from the churches, as well as both capitalist and communist states'. The report protested against Garang's demand to 'take part in ruling the whole of Sudan through participating in the government' and to 'rebuild the army in order to integrate rebel soldiers'. 46 sovereignty over Muslims. 54 Having been subjected to Khartoum's rule for nearly two centuries, South Sudan could not be allowed to reverse this reality. 55 The 2000s, nonetheless, triggered changes in both Sudanese politics and the MB discourse on the subject. Other reports aimed to demonstrate that the South Sudanese leadership could not control outbursts of violence. 61 One of these reports quoted a NCP member of parliament saying that 'the South is trying to cover up its security shortcomings'. 62 Another report stated Osama Gado, a MB member of parliament from Alexandria, cautioned that South Sudan 'is Egypt's strategic depth' and that its secession would constitute a 'threat to Egypt's water sources, as it would put Nile water at the hands of the rebels'. 68 Khaled Ouda, a geologist described as 'one of the MB's leaders in the Asyut Province', alerted Ikhwan Online's readers that 'Egypt is most likely to be affected by the dangers of draught and desertification if secession is to occur'. 88 This left the new government with the option of using these existing institutions and immerse itself in domestic politics.
Consequently, in the field of foreign policy, 'the Brotherhood continued to behave like a loyal opposition movement despite having won both parliamentary and presidential elections'. 
Conclusion
It is necessary to stress again that this article does not deny that the MB has gone through a transformation over the years. It does question the extent to which we could actually describe this as moderation. If we go back to the definitions of moderation offered by Schwedler, Olson and Lynch, we can isolate two intertwined important elements: willingness to reconsider traditional stances against a changing reality, and to engage in some dialogue with other actors. 
